In the United States from 2001 to 2006, federal regulations allowed entrants to lease from incumbents at relatively low cost all of the network infrastructure necessary to provide local phone service. These platform entrants could then provide phone service without installing any of their own equipment. Advocates of this policy claimed that it was needed to provide an economically feasible means by which entrants could serve residential customers. Critics contended that the policy substantially deterred loop entry whereby entrants installed their own switching equipment and leased only the wires that connect a customer's premises to the telephone network. An analysis of panel data for each state over this period indicates that the policy's critics may have been correct. The crossprice elasticity of loop entry with respect to platform price was roughly 1.0. A back of the envelope calculation suggests that loop entry may have decreased by roughly 20% due to platform entry price reductions.
regulators were giving loop entrants, "the back of their hand." (U.S. F.C.C., 2003b)
Without entrant investment, it was claimed that substantial competition would not materialize. This study is closely related to . 4 They use a pooled data set to analyze the determinants of loop and platform entry. Among their findings is that, for both types of entry, as the cost of that type of entry increases, the level of entry falls. Their estimates of the cross-price elasticity of demand suggest that loop and platform entry are not substitutes.
This paper improves upon the existing literature in at least three important dimensions. First, the data employed cover nearly the entire period during which platform entry was available. Second, state fixed effects are included in the estimations. The inclusion of these effects allows for a precise measure of the effects of changes in lease 3 Another objection raised by critics of platform entry was that it reduced incentives for incumbents to invest in equipment. A number of authors have analyzed this question and their conclusions vary. Crandall (2004) and Hazlett, Havenner, and Bazelon (2003) find that the platform price is negatively related to incumbent investment, while Willig, et al (2002) and Phoenix Center (2003) do not. Researchers have also looked at the effect of platform entry on the stock returns of incumbents. See Ingraham and Sidak (2003) and Ekelund and Ford (2003) . Finally, Beard, Ford, and Koutsky (2005) investigate the effect of platform entry on entrant investment, which can be viewed as a rough proxy for loop entry. 4 Crandall, Ingraham, and Singer (2004) investigate whether the cost of loop entry influences the level of entry where entrants build all of the facilities (including the loop) used to provide service. They find that the loop price reduces the share of lines of which entrants build all of the facilities.
prices within a given state, holding all time-invarying factors constant. Finally, lags of the explanatory variables are included to more accurately reflect the non-instantaneous effects of changes in market conditions. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background information regarding the regulatory treatment of platform entry. The data used and estimation specification are explained in Section 3. The estimation results are described and discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Background Information
A primary objective of TA96 is to facilitate competition in the local telecommunications market. The Act includes provisions that allow entrants to lease parts of the incumbents' networks.
5 TA96 directs that the prices for these unbundled network elements (UNEs) are to be set at relatively low rates 6 by state public utility commissions.
Since the passage of TA96, the FCC has grappled with the issue of what parts of the incumbents' networks should be made available as UNEs. The Act states that incumbents must make available to entrants those networks elements without which the entrant would be impaired in providing a given services. The local loop, the wires that connect a customer's premises with the broader phone network, has generally been viewed as meeting this criteria. As such, the availability of loop entry has been relatively uncontroversial.
However, the concept of platform entry has been very contentious. Two regulatory requirements are necessary for platform entry to be feasible: entrants must be able to These data are the basis for the dependent variable in the analysis: the number of lines leased by entrants via loop entry.
These data are combined with the prices set in each state under the two means of entry. State public utility commissions hold proceedings in which incumbents and entrants propose prices for the hundreds of UNEs that incumbents must make available. For obvious reasons, the entrants' proposed rates are invariably lower than those proposed by incumbents. After reviewing the proposed pricing models, the commissions then choose the UNE prices. The prices typically stay in effect for two or three years, at which which point they are revisited by the commissions. Starting in April 2001, Billy Jack Gregg of the West Virginia Office of the Consumer Advocate surveyed the state public utility commissions on the prices they set for platform and loop entry.
The price variables used in the analysis below are from the Gregg survey and are the monthly averages 10 entrants must pay the incumbent under the two means of entry in a given state.
Information regarding federal regulation of the incumbent is also included. Under TA96, incumbents were not allowed to sell long-distance service in a state until the FCC had concluded that the market for local phone service was sufficiently open to competition. 11 Thus, the incumbents had an incentive to take steps to demonstrate that entry was feasible in the market. To capture this effect, a dummy variable is included that takes a value of 1 starting when the incumbent submitted an application to sell long-distance service that was eventually approved. Table 1 , with data regarding first differences of the variables reported in the bottom half of the table. The sample average number of lines served via loop entry in each state is roughly 75,000, with a maximum of almost 500,000. On average, the monthly platform price is roughly 20% larger than the loop price. The first differences statistics indicate that, on average, during the sample period loop entry was increasing while loop and platform prices were falling. State fixed effects are included to control for any unobserved differences across states that do not vary over the sample period. For instance, if a given state is significantly more attractive to entry in some way that does not vary between January 2002 and July 2005, this difference will be capture by the state fixed effect. As such, the coefficient estimates will reflect the effects of changes in the explanatory variables over time within 12 Data for Alaska and Hawaii are not included.
a given state (and not across states). 13 Finally, a time trend variable and a squared time trend variable are included to account for non-linear patterns of entry.
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The resulting estimating equation is:
where i indexes the state and t indexes the half-year. The index k accounts for the inclusion of two lags of each of the explanatory variables that reflect cost, demand, and regulatory conditions.
Given inertia in the level of loop entry, serial correlation of the errors is a concern.
Further, national shocks may create heteroskedasticity across states. These concerns are borne out in diagnostic tests. Wooldridge's test for autocorrelation indicates that the errors are serially correlated in the first order, while a likelihood ratio test indicates that heteroskedasticity is present across states. To address this concern, Prais-Winsten estimates are used that allow for first-order autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, both within each state and across the states for a given time period.
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Equation (1) is estimated both as a linear function and a log-linear function. The log-linear function is often used in demand analysis and has the advantage of the 13 As only one incumbent serves each state, the state fixed effects also control for any time invarying factors common to a single incumbent.
14 In estimations not reported below, a dummy variable was included that equaled one after the June 2004 Bush administration decision not to appeal the court ruling that struck down platform entry. The coefficient on the variable was statistically and economically insignificant and the remaining coefficients were largely unchanged. 15 Ordinary least squares estimates are also employed in which Huber-White errors are clustered at the state level. While the clustered standard errors are robust to any correlation within a state, they do not allow for heteroskedasticity across panels. The results from this approach are very similar to the Prais-Winsten estimates and are reported in the Appendix. coefficients corresponding to elasticity estimates. However, as the log-linear function assumes a constant elasticity, the linear functional form is also estimated.
The coefficients of interest are β 2,0 , β 2,1 , and β 2,2 , which correspond to the three lags of the price of platform entry. These parameters will indicate whether changes in the cost of platform entry were correlated with the changes in the level of loop entry. If these parameters are close to zero, it would suggest that availability of platform entry had a limited effect on loop entry. If instead the coefficients are significantly positive, it could indicate that entrants shifted from loop entry to platform entry in response to decreases in the cost of platform entry. 16 Four different specifications are reported in Table 2 . Columns I and II report estimates based on a linear functional form, whereas Columns III and IV are based on a log-linear specification. As such, the effects in Columns I and II should be interpreted as the effect on loop entry from a one-unit change in the explanatory variable. Conversely, the effects reported in Columns III and IV are the (constant) elasticities of loop entry with respect to the each of the explanatory variables.
Results

Total Effects
The explanatory variables included also vary across the specifications. Specifica- 16 An underlying assumption of this model is that the loop and platform prices are exogenous to the level of entry. As noted by Crandall, Ingraham, and Singer (2004), this assumption is reasonable given that entrants are unlikely to be able to purposely influence the prices through their entry decisions. The inclusion of state fixed effects further mitigates this concern.
tions I and III only include the entry price variables, while Specifications II and IV include the regulatory and market variables. The similarity of the results in Columns I and II and Columns III and IV indicate that the estimates are robust to the included explanatory variables.
The estimates indicate that, as one would expect, the own-price effect is negative.
Columns I and II indicate that a $1 increase in the monthly loop cost is correlated with a decrease of roughly 4000 lines within one year. The result is statistically significant at a confidence level of over 99%. Measured at the overall mean, a $1 increase in loop price leads to an approximately 6% decrease in loop entry. In terms of the elasticity, the log-linear coefficients in Columns III and IV suggest that the own-price elasticity of loop entry is roughly 1.3.
As noted above, the effect of interest is that of the platform price on loop entry.
The estimates suggest that changes in platform prices influenced the level of loop entry.
The coefficient estimates from the linear specification range from 1073 to 1205, with the statistical significance of the estimate in Column II only 93%. However, the lack of statistical significance appears to be due to the coefficient of the unlagged platform price. When this coefficient is not included in the calculation of the total effect, the point estimate increases to nearly 1300 and the statistical significance rises to over 99%.
Conversely, the log-linear estimates in Columns III and IV are both highly statistically significant.
The economic significance of the effect of platform price on loop entry differs somewhat between the linear and the log-linear specifications. Based on the linear specification, a $1 decrease in the platform price is correlated with a decrease of roughly 1300 lines leased by entrants via loop entry. Measured at the mean of loop entry, this translates to a less than 2% decrease. The estimated cross-price elasticities from Columns III and IV indicate that the cross-price elasticity is roughly 1.0, which indicates an arguably significant economic effect. This apparent contradiction will be explored further in Section 4.2
The effects from the regulatory and demand controls are somewhat surprising. The effects of the incumbent successfully applying to sell long-distance services are noteworthy. Since the application was judged by whether the local phone service market was open to competition, one would expect a positive effect on entry. The negative effect on loop entry may reflect difficulty that entrants encountered when competing with incumbents once they were allowed to sell long-distance services. The effect of income is statistically insignificant, while the effect of population of limited economic significance. These two results suggest that the state fixed effects are controlling for much of the differences in the attractiveness of entry across states. Table 3 reports the estimated elasticities of loop entry with respect to the platform price. Columns 1 and 2 are based on the linear estimates, while Column III is based on the log-linear specification and is thus the coefficient estimates from Table 2 . While Columns I and II are both based on the linear specification, they differ in how they are calculated. Column I calculates the elasticity at the sample means of the entry and price variables. Alternatively, the estimates in Column II are based on a two-step calculation. First, a state-specific elasticity is calculated for each state based on the level of loop entry and loop and platform prices in that state. 17 The mean of these state-specific elasticities is reported in Column II.
Elasticities
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Whereas the Column I estimate suggests a limited relationship between loop entry and the platform price, the estimates Columns II and III imply a stronger link. The 17 The values of these variables in January 2004 were used in the calculation. This date was selected to reflect a point in the sample period when platform entry was well-established. As a robustness test, other dates were used in these calculations with little effect on the elasticity estimates. 18 The cross-price elasticity estimate for West Virginia, 35.0, was judged unreliable adn excluded from the calculation of the mean.
latter estimates indicate that a 10% decrease in the platform price was associated with a roughly 10% decrease in loop entry. All three figures are significantly larger than the statistically insignificant estimate of 0.1 by Beard and Ford (2002) . However, as noted above, Beard and Ford use a pooled regression that reflects cross-sectional variation.
Given the divergent estimates, one is left to assess which results are more credible.
The estimates in Columns II and III are arguably more plausible. Using the overall sample means to calculate the elasticity, as is done in Column I, masks the variability in the operating environments across states. The estimates in Column II incorporate this variability. Further, the estimates in Columns II and III are based on different functional forms. The similarity of these estimates provide further confidence in the estimate of roughly 1.0.
Estimate of Forgone Loop Entry
Given that the price of platform entry may have been correlated with the level of loop entry, one may want to determine the total effect of changes in the platform price on loop entry during the sample period. Using the cross price elasticity estimate, a backof-the-envelope approximation of this forgone entry can be calculated. Recall that the price elasticity is calculated as entry,price = ∆Entry Entry ∆P rice P rice (2) The total effect on loop entry can be approximated by using the estimated elasticity, the number of platform price changes and the average amount of each change, and the average platform price and level of loop entry. Specifically, ∆Entry = (numpricechanges) * entry,price * ∆price price * (entry)
During the sample period, the platform price changed 134 times, the average change was -$1.40, the average platform price was $18.74, and the average level of loop entry was 76,508. For simplicity, the cross price elasticity is approximated as 1.0. Based on these figures, the estimate of loop entry lines foregone for the sample period for the 48
states and the District of Columbia is approximately 750,000 lines. Given the national total of 3.8 million lines serviced by loop entry, the estimate suggests that the level of loop entry in the U.S. would have been roughly 20% higher but for the decreases in platform prices.
The estimate of forgone entry is limited by the use of the overall sample means, which abstracts away important differences across states. Further, the estimate assumes a constant cross-price elasticity, which may not be applicable. However, the magnitude of the estimate suggests that there may have been a significant negative impact on loop entry from platform entry.
Conclusion
This paper addresses whether platform entry affected loop entry in U.S. local telecommunications markets. The results suggest that platform entry may have limited loop entry. As such, some support is provided to those who believe that platform entry was a hindrance to introducing competition to local telephone markets. Further, the estimate of 750,000 forgone lines of loop may be a lower bound, as the analysis above only measures the incremental effect of platform price decreases on loop entry. Loop entry could have also been discouraged by the relatively low prices set for platform entry when the option was introduced. Also, there is no measurement of the potential effect of platform entry on other forms of phone service, such as those provided by cable companies and voice-over-internet-protocol providers.
Nevertheless, platform entry was widely implemented by entrants and arguably provided some customers with choices that they otherwise would not have had. Over 16 million phone lines were provided by entrants utilizing platform entry as of 2004.
For those policymakers who viewed platform entry as a relatively close substitute to loop entry, platform entry may be considered as a regulatory success.
The future of platform entry is muddled. Soon after it became clear that platform entry at regulated low prices would be eliminated, the two largest platform entry players, AT&T and MCI, announced large asset write downs and were eventually acquired by other companies. The incumbents claim that they are open to continuing to offer platform entry and some entrants have entered into agreements to continue providing service via platform entry. However, time will tell whether platform entry at privately negotiated prices will emerge as a viable entry model. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Panel-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses.
The Prais-Winsten estimates are based on errors that follow an AR(1) process common to each state and heteroskedasticity within states and across states in a given period.
State fixed effects omitted for brevity. 
